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Throughout the period between the fall of empire and the establishment of 
communist regime, foreign trade generally played a relatively minor role. 
This finding is to a certain extent surprising considering the fact that for-
eigners were interested in trade with the Middle Kingdom as far back as
the 18th century. From the very beginning, this area was unfavourably af-
fected by significant factors which hampered its more rapid development. 
The consequences of the dramatic and chaotic interior development in 
China were among the most important ones: the foreign trade was affected 
by the consequences of the Japanese aggression – the invasion of Manchu-
ria in 1931 as well the attack against China proper in 1937. Basic statisti-
cal overviews clearly indicate that the loss of Manchuria in the early 1930s 
substantially affected the total volume of the Chinese foreign trade,1 also 
clearly influencing its commodity structure.2
1 From the perspective of the Chinese foreign trade, the loss of Manchuria was a grave 
event. In 1929–1931, the three Manchurian provinces procured a full third of the Chinese 
export and was a recipient of 14.6% of import. F. V. FIELD, China’s Foreign Trade, in: 
Far Eastern Survey, Vol. IV, No. 5, March 13, 1935, Institute of Pacific Relations, pp.
33–40; p. 34. The state of Manzhuguo also established its own customs service. In this 
context, the Customs House in Harbin, subject to the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, was dissolved. It was closed down gradually, 
terminating all activities at the end of 1932. For more information, see The Second His-
torical Archives of China, Nanjing, The Maritime Customs Service Archive (hereinafter
SHAC-MCSA), Part Three: Semi-Official Correspondence with Selected Ports (hereinaf-
ter P3), Reel 173, 679 (1) 31894, Letters from H. J. Prettejohn to Frederick Maze (20 
October 1932, 22 December 1932).
2 For further information, see Tables I and II. Cf. e.g. a detailed overview of the commod-
ity structure of the Chinese foreign trade in The China Year Book 1931, London, Chica-
go, Shanghai 1931, pp. 300–306. Detailed documentation on the development of the 
Chinese foreign trade including statistical overviews sent from the Czechoslovak repre-
sentative offices in China to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague can be found also 
in the Archives of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Prague 
(hereinafter AMFA), Section 4 – National Economy (hereinafter only S4NA), folder 
(hereinafter fol.) 636 and 1208. A basic overview of the commodity structure of the Chi-
nese foreign trade is also available at the Internet presentation of the University of Bris-
tol, Department of Historical Studies, http://www.bris.ac.uk/history/customs/datasets 
(quoted Apr. 17, 2012).
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Table I: China’s foreign trade in 1912–1936
(values in common prices, in mil. haikwan taels)
Year Import Export Balance Index of the total turnover 
of the foreign trade (1913 
= 100)
1912 473 371 -102 86.7
1913 570 403 -167 100.0
1914 569 356 -213 95.1
1915 454 419 -35 89.7
1916 516 482 -34 102.5
1917 550 463 -87 104.0
1918 555 486 -69 106.9
1919 647 631 -16 131.3
1920 762 542 -220 133.9
1921 906 601 -305 154.8
1922 945 655 -290 164.4
1923 923 753 -170 172.2
1924 1018 772 -246 183.9
1925 948 776 -172 177.1
1926 1124 864 -260 204.2
1927 1013 919 -94 198.4
1928 1196 991 -205 224.6
1929 1266 1016 -250 234.4
1930 1310 895 -415 226.5
1931 1433 909 -524 240.7
1932 1049 493 -556 158.4
1933 864 (1346) 612 (393) -471 (734) 129.1
1934 661 (1030) 344 (536) -317 (494) 103.2
1935 590 (919) 370 (576) -220 (343) 98.6
1936 604 (942) 453 (707) -151 (235) 108.6
Sources: Hsiao, Liang-lin, China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864–1949,
Cambridge (Mass.) 1974, pp. 23–24; Cheng, Yu-kwei, Foreign Trade and 
Industrial Development of China, Washington 1956, p. 259. Cf. The China 
Year Book 1931, London, Chicago, Shanghai 1931, p. 270.
Note: The prices featured in years 1933–1936 are in millions of Chinese 
dollars, equivalents in haikwan tales are in parentheses.
For that matter, it is essentially impossible to reconstruct the scope 
and structure of the foreign trade China-wide for the period from 1937. 
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First of all, this task is complicated by the lack of statistical data and other 
relevant information. Statistics concerning foreign trade are incomplete for 
many reasons. For example, they did not include information about import 
for the Chinese army, there was a tendency of importers to declare lower 
value of goods than their real one, and there is a question of the value of 
the goods smuggled to China.3 The problem of smuggling was a long-term 
phenomenon, which reached serious proportions. Smuggled goods repeat-
edly included gold, silver, sugar, opium and other drugs. Chinese govern-
ment was thus deprived not only of the income from customs but also of 
tax income.4 In this context, we should mention the correspondence from 
the autumn of 1931 between the office of the inspector general of the Chi-
nese Maritime Customs Service and the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. 
These letters contain major criticism of the situation in Shanghai. The In-
spector General and his subordinates complain about many problems. 
They criticize Shanghai merchants, who do not make an effort at aiding in 
the fight against smuggling. The work of the Shanghai police is perceived 
similarly as they do not pay much attention to smuggling and if they do 
catch a smuggler, they merely confiscate the goods without punishing the 
smuggler.5 Regular reports on smuggling sent to the Office of the Inspec-
tor General from the treaty ports show that not only the Chinese but also a 
wide spectrum of foreigners were involved in smuggling. The smuggled 
goods were found not only in Chinese ships (private as well as state), but 
also in British, Japanese, Portuguese or Norwegian ones. The above men-
tioned reports also demonstrated some logical “regional differences.” For 
example, in comparison to Shanghai, there were more Portuguese smug-
gler ships in Canton, while the Japanese smuggler ships prevailed in the 
former.6
3 For more information, see K. Bloch, The Puzzle of Chinese Trade Statistics, in: Far 
Eastern Survey, Vol. 9, No. 22, Nov. 6, 1940, Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 264–266.
4 The problem of smuggling continued even in the period after World War II. Frequently 
smuggled commodities included also salt. Cf. e.g. the confiscation of 4235 kg of salt in 
January 1948. SHAC-MCSA, Part Four: The Policing of Trade (hereinafter P4), Reel 
218, 679 (1) 20364, I.G. dispatch, Shanghai, No. 196142, date: 9. 1. 1948.
5 For more information, see SHAC-MCSA, P4, Reel 217, 679 (1) 20362, Letter from 
Inspector General to Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce (21 October, 1931); Ibid., 
Letter from Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to F.W. Maze, Inspectorate Gen-
eral of Customs (15 October, 1931). Documents concerning smuggling to China can be 
also found in SHAC-MCSA, P4, Reel 183, 679 (1) 824; Ibidem, Reel 218, 679 (1) 20364; 
Ibid., Reel 219, 679 (1) 20365.
6 Generally speaking, the Japanese presence and trade activities were bigger in Shanghai 
than in Canton. As concerns the illegal activities of the Portuguese ships in Canton, the 
nearness of Macao played an important role. Cf. e.g. reports on smuggling activities from 
Canton and Shanghai from 1936 and 1937. Reports from Canton SHAC-MCSA, Part 
Five: The Policing of Trade (further P5), Reel 252, 679 (1) 28160, Canton smuggling 
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When analyzing foreign trade, we must take into account several 
other facts, such as the actual division of China. Unoccupied China repre-
sented one area, Manchuria under the Japanese control was the second 
one, occupied China, where puppet regimes were eventually established,7
were the third area and the north-west area under the communist control 
was number four. Economic ties among these areas were essentially dis-
rupted, moreover, the nationalist government was from the end of 1937 
cut off from the economically most important coastal provinces and large 
ports, through which a vast majority of the foreign trade was realised be-
fore the war with Japan.8 For example in the last year before the war, in 
1936, of the total import of USD 280 mil., 59% went through Shanghai 
and 27% through North China ports.9 Some of the factors which hampered 
the development of foreign trade have been mentioned earlier, be it the 
insufficiently developed transport network, for a long time also the exist-
ence of customs in inland China, so-called likin, the predominance of tra-
ditional agriculture, which was not export oriented, low purchasing power 
of the population and many others. Some objective circumstances also 
played a negative role, such as the great distance between China and its 
important trade partners. Chinese foreign trade was also to some extent 
affected by the Great Depression, although it was somewhat delayed.
From the end of the 19th century through the fall of the nationalist 
regime in 1949, import exceeded export, the Chinese trade balance was 
thus permanently negative. The trade deficit achieved its lowest level in 
the period of World War I, when import was essentially at a standstill, at 
the same time giving more space to Chinese exporters (for more infor-
mation, see Table I). Permanently highest negative balance was reached in 
the foreign trade realized via Shanghai – in 1936, it was USD 57 mil.10
report for November, 1936 (18 January 1937); Ibid., Canton smuggling report for De-
cember, 1936 (18 February 1937); Ibidem, Canton smuggling report for July, 1937 (19 
October 1937). Reports from Shanghai SHAC-MCSA, P5, Reel 262, 679 (1) 28140, 
Shanghai smuggling report for November 1936 (4 January 1937); Ibidem, Shanghai 
smuggling report for December 1936 (19 February 1937), Ibidem, Shanghai smuggling 
report for July 1937 (18 September 1937).
7 Apart from the Wang Jingwei’s collaborationist government in Nanking, Japanese es-
tablished another puppet government in Beijing placing at its head a former high-ranking 
imperial official Wang Kemin. It was a consequence of the Tokyo’s intention to initiate 
the establishment of several puppet regimes in the area of occupied China in order to 
facilitate the enforcement of occupation policy. 
8 For the comparison of the development of individual regions in the period of 1937–
1945, see China at War: Regions of China, 1937–1945, S. R. MACKINNON, D. LARY,
E. F. VOGEL (Eds.), Stanford 2007.
9 BLOCH, p. 265.
10 Ibidem, p. 266.
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The Chinese share in the international trade grew from 1.7% in 1912 to 
2.2% in 1931 (according to the estimates of the League of Nations, the 
China’s share in the world trade in 1933 was 2.32%),11 but in relation to 
other countries it was still extremely small.
The customs autonomy became an important landmark from the 
perspective of the foreign economic relations. The loss of the customs 
autonomy was an unfavourable and naturally humiliating consequence of 
the unequal treaties signed in the 19th century, one of the sensitive issues 
in the relations between China and the West. The question of regaining 
customs autonomy was for China not only of economic importance. The 
change in the approach of the western countries to this issue and more 
willingness to concession were first manifest during the Washington Na-
val Conference.12 The customs problem remained a topical issue also in 
the ensuing years; in 1925–1926, a conference focusing on this problem 
and attended by foreign representatives was held in Beijing.13 This prob-
lem was finally resolved by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanking government, 
which started to consistently strive for the termination of the unequal trea-
ties signed in the past. Concerning the customs issue, it was the United 
States, which as the first of western countries took the initiative and by a 
treaty of July 1928 acknowledged the tariff autonomy of China (the Chi-
nese government was to freely determine the customs to import to and 
export from China in the future). This treaty, which also contained the 
most-favoured-nation clause, was a real breakthrough in the old contractu-
al order. Before the end of 1928, tariff autonomy treaties were also signed 
with other countries.14 On February 1929, China introduced a new cus-
toms tariff,15 which caused a considerable increase of customs tariffs, 
which, naturally, could not stimulate foreign trade, rather the contrary. On 
11 FIELD, p. 33.
12 The Washington Naval Conference took place from November 12, 1921, to February 6, 
1922. As a result of the Washington agreements, Chinese customs tariffs increased as of 
1922. For more information, see The Special Tariff Conference, Tientsin Press, Tientsin 
1925, p. 1, pp. 25–28.
13 For more information, see The Special Tariff Conference, passim.
14 In January 1929, Japan was the only important country which had not signed a new 
tariff treaty with China. This situation was a consequence of many controversial issues in 
relations between the two countries. An agreement between China and Japan was finally 
signed in May 1930, after the nationalist government had undertaken to pay old debts to 
Japan. 
15 Cf. original instructions to the introduction of the new customs tariff by the Inspector 
General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service sent to individual customs offices in 
the treaty ports SHAC-MCSA, Part One: Inspector General’s Circulars (further P1), Reel 
18, 679 (1) 26909, Circular No. 3854 (31 January 1929), signed by F. W. Maze (Inspec-
tor General).
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the other hand, this step was fiscally important for the Nanking govern-
ment, with the customs income being clearly one of the most important 
items of the state income in the ensuing years.16
Table II: Commodity structure of the Chinese import in 1913–1936
(percentage of the total value expressed in common prices)
1913 1916 1920 1925 1928 1931 1936
Cotton goods 19.3 14.1 21.8 16.3 14.2 7.6 1.5
Cotton thread 12.7 12.4 10.6 4.4 1.6 0.3 0.2
Raw cotton 0.5 1.6 2.4 7.4 5.7 12.6 3.8
Rice, wheat 3.3 6.6 0.8 6.8 5.7 12.6 3.8
Wheat flour 1.8 0.2 0.3 1.6 2.6 2.0 0.5
Sugar 6.4 7.1 5.2 9.5 8.3 6.0 2.2
Tobacco 2.9 5.8 4.7 4.1 5.1 4.4 1.8
Paper 1.3 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.4 3.2 4.1
Paraffin oil 4.5 6.2 7.1 7.0 5.2 4.5 4.2
Crude oil – 0.2 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.8 4.1
Means of transport 0.8 4.0 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.3 5.6
Chemicals, pigments 5.6 4.1 6.4 5.6 7.5 8.0 10.8
Iron, steel and other 
metals 5.3 5.1 8.3 4.7 5.4 6.2 13.3
Machines 1.4 1.3 3.2 1.8 1.8 3.1 6.4
Other 34.2 29.5 24.3 26.0 30.8 27.4 37.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Cheng, p. 34.
In connection with customs issues, we should mention the Chinese 
Maritime Customs Service.17 It was an institution, subject to the Chinese 
government, with foreigners of many nationalities holding executive posi-
16 For more information on achieving the tariff autonomy, see JI, Zhaojin, A History of 
Modern Shanghai Banking: the Rise and Decline of China’s Finance Capitalism, Ar-
monk, New York 2003, pp. 171–172.
17 Interesting documents concerning the functioning of this institution can be found in v 
The Maritime Customs Service Archive, which is stored in The Second Historical Ar-
chives of China, Nanjing. For basic orientation in the rich material of these archives (or 
more precisely in its first sections) see the indexes in SHAC-MCSA, P1, Reel 1, 679 (1) 
26918, 679 (8) 8, 679 (1) 27211; Ibidem, Reel 2, 679 (1) 30154, 679 (1) 27221, 679 (1) 
24721, 679 (1) 27253; SHAC-MCSA, Part Two: London Office Files (further P2), Reel 
63, 679 (2) 1188–9, 679 (2) 27306; Ibidem, Reel 64, 679 (1) 27307–9, 679 (9) 8572, 679 
(9) 8574–6; Ibidem, Reel 65, 679 (9) 8573.
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tions (with the British holding most of these positions). The Chinese Mari-
time Customs Service’s primary role was to collect customs in treaty 
ports, nevertheless it was active also in other areas, such as the fight 
against smuggling and regular publishing of overviews of economic or 
even demographic data.18 Basically, we can agree with the view that long 
before the establishment of the Nanking government, the customs service 
was “practically the only agency through which reliable economic and 
other information on China could be obtained.”19 Efficient functioning of 
the Chinese Maritime Customs Service was quite important also for 
Chiang’s government as it procured most of the Nanking regime’s income. 
After the conflict with Japan20 had escalated and important Chinese cities 
had been occupied in 1937, the Chinese Maritime Customs Service con-
tinued its work, albeit in much worsened conditions,21 formally still being 
subject to Chiang’s government.22 In December 1941, this institution, first 
of all its headquarters in Shanghai, was seized by the Japanese who also 
appointed the new Inspector General.23 The Chinese Maritime Customs 
Service continued its activities after World War II until the establishment 
18 For the different activities of the Customs Service, see T. P. LYONS, China Maritime Cus-
toms and China’s Trade Statistics, 1859–1948, Trumansburg (NY) 2003. Cf. D. BRUNERO,
Britain’s Imperial Cornerstone in China: the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, 1854–
1949, New York 2006.
19 SHAC-MCSA, P1, Reel 19, 679 (1) 26910, Circular No. 4133 (5 November 1930), 
signed by Percy R. Walsham (For Inspector General).
20 The very beginning of the Japanese invasion in July 1937 was not immediately im-
portant for the daily operations of the Customs Service as is documented in the corre-
spondence between the Office of the Inspector General and individual customs offices 
from this period. SHAC-MCSA, P3, Reel 120, 679 (1) 32230.
21 For example, major personnel changes took place. Under the pressure of the Japanese 
bodies, more Japanese employees were hired. On the other hand, some foreigners decided 
to leave this institution as well as China; a high number of resignations occurred at the 
time of the battle of Shanghai (August–November 1937). SHAC-MCSA, P2, Reel 80, 
679 (1) 31848, Letter from Mr. Macoun to Frederick Maze (6 September, 1937); Ibidem,
Letter from Frederick Maze to Mr. Macoun (9 October, 1937). For more information 
concerning the second half of 1937, such as complaints of trade companies against the 
Japanese fleet, which imposed a blockade on the Chinese coast, see SHAC-MCSA, Part 
Six: The Sino-Japanese War and its Aftermath, 1931–1949 (further P6), Reel 283, 679 
(1) 14857, Letter from Chief Secretary (H. Kishimoto) to the Commissioner of Customs, 
Canton (7 October 1937).
22 Cf. e.g. the correspondence between the Office of the Inspector General with the bodies 
of Chiang’s government in Chongqing form 1938, which is to be found in SHAC-MCSA, 
Part Seven: The Sino-Japanese War and its Aftermath, 1931–1949 (further P7), Reel 330, 
679 (1) 31693.
23 Chiang’s reaction to this step was an establishment of a new, to some extent interim 
office of the inspector general in Chongqing.
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of the communist regime. The last Inspector General Lester Knox Little 
resigned in January 1950.24
As concerns the foreign trade’s commodity structure, it was rather 
one-sided, which certainly cannot be viewed as advantage. Essentially 
throughout the entire 19th century, tea and silk or silk fabric, were by far 
the most important Chinese export items. In 1871, their share in the total 
volume of exports still amounted 92%, and it was not until the last two 
decades of the 19th century that it dropped noticeably.25 From the begin-
ning of the republican period, the commodity structure of Chinese export 
changed considerably and the share of both commodities kept dropping: in 
1913–1936, the share of tea averaged at 4.7% in the total volume of ex-
ports.26 Silk and silk products remained ones of the most important items, 
nevertheless, their importance for China’s total export visibly diminished. 
No commodity had prevailed permanently and after World War I, there 
was a considerable growth in numbers of exported and imported items.27
The total export was marked by a significant growth of such articles as 
soya beans and soya bean products as well as hides, leather and furs, and 
we should also mention an increase in the export of ores and metals.28
In the 19th century, also the commodity structure of import to Chi-
na was rather narrow, with opium being its main component for decades. 
In the 1990s, opium was surpassed by the import of cotton fabric and cot-
ton yarn, which around 1900 represented 40% of Chinese imports. Even-
tually, also this segment experienced a decline as a result of the develop-
ment of the textile industry in China. Towards the end of the examined 
period, there was a remarkable growth in import of chemicals and pig-
ments (in 1913–1936 by 92%), iron, steel and other metals (in 1913–1936 
by 149%) and machines (in 1913–1936 even by 357%), which however 
has to be viewed realistically as the absolute value of the import of ma-
chines was still at a low level. Apart from the above, Chinese import also 
24 In the examined period, the position of the Inspector General was held by Francis 
Aglen (1911–1929), Frederick Maze (1929–1943) and Lester Knox Little (1943–1950). 
During the Pacific War, the Japanese appointed Hirokichi Kishimoto (1941–1945) as the 
Inspector General. For more information on the gradual dissolution of the Chinese Mari-
time Customs Service in 1949, see the correspondence of the Inspector General, e.g. 
SHAC-MCSA, P2, Reel 82, 679 (1) 31856, Letter from L. K. Little to Mr. Ensor (3 
March, 1949); Ibidem, Letter from E. N. Ensor to Mr. Little (8 April, 1949).
25 Around 1900, tea amounted to approximately half of the total export.
26 The long-term decrease of tea in the Chinese export was related, among other things, to 
the growing competition in the world market, mainly by British India, Ceylon and Dutch 
East India. 
27 According to the data from the customs office, in 1934, the list of imported goods in-
cluded a total of 483 items, while the export 356 items. FIELD, p. 34.
28 For more information, see CHENG, p. 34.
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featured sugar as an important item, whose share in the total import in 
1913–1936 averaged 6.4% (for more information, see Table II).
Britain was China’s main trade partner for a long time,29 at the be-
ginning of the 20th century it was still a recipient of over 40% of goods 
exported from China and procured over 50% of its import. In the interwar 
period, Americans, Japanese and Germans became important competitors 
to the British. The United States were an important partner of China pri-
marily in export; in 1936, more than one quarter of exported Chinese 
goods went to the U.S. American exports to China were maintained at 
approximately 15%. Nevertheless, we have to realize that trade with China 
was at the time merely marginal for the U.S.A., although in 1932, they 
even ranked as number one in the total amount of trade with China.30 Ja-
pan markedly strengthened its position during World War I; in 1919, it 
even procured approximately one third of the import to China and import-
ed the same volume of Chinese goods. Later, Japan’s share was slightly 
decreasing. After World War I, Germany lost its positions in the Chinese 
market, however, it managed to renew them before the end of the 1920s. 
In the 1930s, the German share considerably increased, undoubtedly due 
to the close co-operation of Berlin with Chiang’s regime.31 After World 
War I, the role of Russia in China’s foreign trade considerably weakened 
and it was not until 1937, that it managed to achieve a share in the trade 
with China that would be comparable to that before World War I. The last 
country worth mentioning in this context is France. Before World War I, it 
received approximately 10% of China’s export, however, after the war this 
number was permanently decreasing. As concerns export to China, the 
role of France was merely marginal.32
29 The data for Great Britain and Hong Kong are often provided separately. The high 
numbers concerning Hong Kong quite complicate any serious analysis. A considerable 
(yet unfortunately indeterminable precisely) segment of deliveries going from Hong 
Kong to China (as well as in the opposite direction) consisted of re-exports. Chinese 
records often feature deliveries from different countries, which merely passed via Hong 
Kong (without any changes of ownership) and from there reached the Chinese market as 
import from Hong Kong.
30 FIELD, p. 36a.
31 For information on the German economic presence in China in 1919–1928, or on the eco-
nomic co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in 1928–1938, see U. RATENHOF, Die 
Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945. Wirtschaft – Rüstung – Militär. Boppard 
am Rhein 1987, pp. 271–490.
32 For more information, see Table III. For other details on China’s trade in the nationalist 
era, see e.g. P. RICHARDSON, Economic Change in China, c. 1800–1950, New York 
1999, pp. 43–49.
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Table III: Territorial structure of China’s foreign trade in 1913 and 
1923 (in mil. haikwan taels)
Import Export Total
1913 1923 1913 1923 1913 1923
Australia, New Zealand 0.51 2.69 0.39 1.19 0.90 3.88
Austria-Hungary* 3.00 0.079 1.13 0.096 4.13 0.175
Belgium 11.5 8.70 4.77 2.20 16.27 10.90
British India 35.20 44.19 4.51 9.86 39.71 54.05
Canada 1.36 8.26 0.47 1.60 1.83 9.86
Korea 2.57 9.56 4.96 24.22 7.53 33.78
Dutch East India 4.98 10.88 1.89 6.46 6.87 17.34
France 3.86 6.83 29.70 31.66 33.56 37.69
French Indochina 3.48 14.75 1.37 3.21 4.85 17.96
Germany 20.63 25.96 12.41 9.53 33.04 35.49
Hong Kong 125.12 198.46 85.38 140.63 210.50 339.09
Italy 0.48 2.98 6.06 7.57 6.54 10.55
Japan 87.00 168.81 47.7 158.81 134.70 327.62
Macau 4.80 4.98 3.61 3.17 8.41 8.15
Netherlands 1.03 3.12 6.34 6.80 7.37 9.92
Philippines 1.01 1.08 0.55 3.18 1.56 4.26
Singapore, British Straits Settle-
ments 6.51 7.37 5.50 14.34 12.01 21.71
Sweden 1.12 1.77 0.16 0.22 1.28 1.99
Great Britain 70.64 96.31 11.91 34.56 82.55 130.87
U.S.A. 25.82 123.55 27.44 101.44 53.26 224.99
Russia (USSR) 16.13 8.14 32.72 27.25 48.85 35.39
Source: China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, United States 
Department of Commerce, Washington D.C. 1926, p. 44–45.
Note * For the year 1923, the data concern the successor states. The table 
was compiled based on the information from the Chinese Maritime Cus-
toms Service. In 1913, 1 haikwan tael equalled USD 0.73, in 1923, it was 
USD 0.80.
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Table IV: Import of foreign capital to China in 1902–1936 
(in mil. USD)
1902 % 1914 % 1931 % 1936 %
Direct invest-
ments 503.2 64 1067.0 66 2493.2 77 2681.7 77
Loans to the 
Chinese gov-
ernment / pur-
chase of obliga-
tions issued by 
the Chinese gov-
ernment
284.7 36 525.8 33 710.6 22 766.7 22
Loans to private 
entities – – 17.5 1 38.7 1 34.8 1
TOTAL 787.9 100 1610.3 100 3242.5 100 3483.2 100
Source: Hou, Chi-ming, Foreign Investment and Economic Development 
in China, 1840–1937, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) 1965, 
p. 13.
As concerns the import of foreign capital before 1937, direct in-
vestments clearly prevailed. Purchase of bonds from the Chinese govern-
ment was a specific form of investment, as eventually they became a 
heavy burden for the Chinese government due to the high interest it had to 
pay to the bond holders.33 Loans to private entities were somewhat in the 
background (see Table IV). In the examined period that is until 1937 the 
greatest share in the investments to China was maintained by Great Brit-
ain, 35.6%. Japan became its main competitor, primarily thanks to the 
specific possibilities it had had during World War I and mainly after the 
occupation of Manchuria in 1931. If in 1902 the Japanese share in invest-
33 As it later turned out, the purchase of bonds issued by the Nanking government was a 
rather risky venture. For example in 1936, the Nanking government issued bonds mature 
in 1948. Considering the hyperinflation, accompanied by the collapse of the exchange
rate of the Chinese currency, the sums offered by Chiang Kai-shek’s government to be 
paid in 1948 represented a mere fragment of the invested value. Investing into Chinese 
bonds became an unpleasant experience also for investors from Czechoslovakia. For 
more information, see AMFA, Territorial Department – Open 1945–59, China, fol. 4, A 
copy of a later by J. Labašta to the Embassy  of the Czechoslovak Republic in China 
dated Oct. 6, 1948.
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ments to China was truly marginal (USD 1 mil., i.e., 0.1%), then in 1914 it 
amounted to 13.6% and in 1936 even 40%, surpassing the British. Before 
World War I, the Russians had an exceptionally prominent share in in-
vestments to China, comparable to the British as to the volume (1902 –
30%), which was primarily due to their economic activities in Manchuria. 
After World War I, their share considerably decreased and despite the sig-
nificant growth in the 1930s (1936 – 8.6%), they never managed to restore 
their pre-war position. Germany also underwent a similar development 
and status in investments; during the last years before World War I, its 
average share was nearing remarkable 20%. However, after the war, the 
situation radically changed for Germany, with its investments playing, at 
least as to quantity, a considerably limited role in China’s economy (1936 
– 4.3%). France’s share in investments to China was continually decreas-
ing and in the examined period, it dropped approximately by half. The 
influx of capital from other countries was of little significance in the long 
term (for more information, see Table V).
Table V: Territorial structure of the import of foreign capital to Chi-
na in 1902–1936 (in mil. USD)
1902 % 1914 % 1931 % 1936 %
Great Britain 260.3 33.0 607.5 37.7 1189.2 36.7 1220.8 35.0
Japan 1.0 0.1 219.6 13.6 1136.9 35.1 1394.0 40.0
Russia / USSR 246.5 31.3 269.3 16.7 273.2 8.4 – –
USA 19.7 2.5 49.3 3.1 196.8 6.1 298.8 8.6
France 91.1 11.6 171.4 10.7 192.4 5.9 234.1 6.7
Germany 164.3 20.0 263.6 16.4 87.0 2.7 148.5 4.3
Belgium 4.4 0.6 22.9 1.4 89.0 2.7 58.4 1.7
Netherlands – – – – 28.7 0.9 – –
Italy – – – – 46.4 1.4 72.3 2.1
Scandinavian 
countries – – – – 2.9 0.1 – –
Other 0.6 0.1 6.7 0.4 – – 56.3 1.6
TOTAL 787.9 100 1610.3 100 3242.5 100 3483.2 100
Source: Hou, p. 17.
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Abstract
The foreign trade did not play a very significant role in the Chinese econ-
omy during the last decades of Qing dynasty and it did not change very 
much after the fall of empire and the establishment of the new republic. 
From a fiscal point of view, the significance of foreign trade increased 
because of growing revenues of customs duties. However, the foreign 
trade’s influence on both the structure and performance of the national 
economy stayed marginal. As for the import of foreign capital, direct in-
vestments clearly prevailed before 1937. Chinese government bonds rep-
resented an interesting phenomenon and rather risky investment. They 
definitely became a heavy burden for the Chinese government due to the 
high interest it had to pay to the bond holders.
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